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Eating Well with Pleshette DeArmitt 
Sarah Kathryn Marshall 
The University of Memphis  
Every work is an occasional work: this simply means that each work has a 
beginning, that it begins at a certain moment in time and that that 
moment in time is a part of the work, since without it the work would have 
been only an insurmountable problem, nothing more than the 
impossibility of writing it.1 
-Maurice Blanchot 
The piece that follows is an occasional work,2 begun “with nothing in 
mind,” nothing: the single, unbearable thought that Pleshette is no more.3  It is 
irrevocably inscribed in a certain moment to which I found myself unable to 
return, reappropriate, incorporate, or unify into another work après coup.4  
More than anything, I wish that this work had been only an insurmountable 
problem, a mere impossibility.  The fact remains that I wrote it in mourning; 
as a work of morning, it was not impossible plain and simple, but rather im-
possible in its “unavoidable betrayal” of the other and yet its “absolute 
fidelity” to her—to Pleshette, whom I “must and must not get over.”5  
*** 
Pleshette was a gifted storyteller.  When we first met, she was on 
sabbatical, completing what was to become her book.  I was visiting 
Memphis as a prospective doctoral student, and she graciously made a trip 
in to campus to share a meal with me.  Over Garibaldi’s “Vegetarian Pizza,” 
which the franchise considers to be “gourmet,” our first conversation was 
about eating well.  Pleshette began to recount some of her successes and 
struggles with ethical eating, including her experiences with French meals 
during her time abroad.  She told me the story of one such meal, during 
which she and Kas were served cow tongue, la langue.  Pleshette expressed 
her own distaste for the course and endearingly poked fun at Kas’s 
unreserved enjoyment of the dish.  Despite her resistance to this foreign 
tongue, she nevertheless partook of an unfamiliar custom.   
Looking back, this encounter has come to condense the image I have of 
Pleshette, an image that revolves around so many meals, and in which the 
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personal and the academic are significantly intertwined.  At the time, 
however, I knew nothing of Pleshette’s scholarly engagement with Derrida’s 
work, more specifically, on eating well, impossible mourning, and the 
remains or the leftover, both translations of the French le reste.  My limited 
study of the French language included neither le reste nor the idiom il faut 
bien manger.  I learned the latter phrase from Pleshette over a meal we shared 
with Seraphine and Marygrace Hemme at a crêperie in the 15th 
arrondissement.  Il faut bien manger, meaning both “one must well eat” and 
“one must eat well,” is an injunction not only to eat, to nourish oneself, but 
also to take enjoyment in doing so; the English, “If you’ve gotta’ do 
something, you might as well do it well,” captures something like the 
sentiment expressed in il faut bien manger.  
In the image I have of her, Pleshette eats well.  Echoing the words of 
Rousseau, Kristeva, and Derrida (on whom I will focus my remarks here), 
Pleshette wrote her own book.  In The Right to Narcissism: A Case for an Im-
possible Self-Love, she gives us the thought of a self-love that is made possible 
only through the love of and for another.  Pleshette takes in Ovid’s 
Narcissus and transforms him.  The experience Narcissus has of himself at 
the pond is mediated by another’s love—Echo’s love—a love he doesn’t 
recognize as such.  No longer the self-absorbed, closed-off tragic figure of 
myth, or at least not merely, Pleshette’s Narcissus must mourn his inability 
to be sufficient unto himself.  This is the condition of every “subject,” self, or 
“I.”   
In a 1989 interview titled “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the 
Subject,” Derrida contends that what has been called “The Subject” is a 
fable.6  But the fabulous nature of this subject is not, on his view, grounds for 
its “simple liquidation.”7  Rather, Derrida argues, “The Subject” must still be 
taken seriously, since this conception of subjectivity continues to influence 
the discourses of many of its most profound critics (including Lacan, 
Levinas, and Heidegger).  As traditionally conceived, the philosophical 
subject is master of itself, autonomous, and self-identical.  Responsibility, 
and hence morality, have been theorized on this basis.  Derrida is critical of 
this understanding of subjectivity, because it is grounded upon a sacrifice of 
the alterity constitutive of what it is to be a self.  For him, the relation of the 
self to itself is characterized by différance:  the self is always already differing 
from and deferring itself; it is other than itself from the very beginning.8  
Any self, according to Derrida, establishes its own identity by taking in that 
which is other and reappropriating it, thereby making it its own.  What has 
been called “The Subject” owes its existence to the necessary interiorization 
or incorporation of the other.  The other, however, can never be fully 
assimilated into the self-same; alterity “resists all subjectivation.”9  There is 
something that remains, something leftover, something indigestible.   
From this, Derrida concludes that the moral question becomes “how, for 
goodness’ sake, should one eat well?”10  One must take in the other, and one 
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must give the other to eat.  This “metonymy of introjection” calls for an 
ethics.11  Eating well, Derrida reminds us, “must be nourishing not only for 
me, […] it must be shared.”12  And sharing a meal means “learning and giving 
to eat,” because “[o]ne never eats entirely on one’s own.”13  What Derrida 
calls “metonymical eating” evokes a law requiring “respect for the other at 
the very moment when […] one must begin to identify with the other, who 
is to be assimilated, interiorized, understood ideally.”14 Such respect 
demands that one address oneself to the other, “speak to him or her in 
words that also pass through the mouth, the ear, and sight.”15 All this in a 
tongue that is and is not one’s own. 
It comes as no surprise to those who know her that, in her recounting of 
Ovid’s tale, Pleshette champions the oft-neglected, sacrificial, feminine 
character.  Truly, Echo is the hero of Pleshette’s book.  She writes, “[i]t 
almost seems as if Echo ‘knew’ that by reiterating Narcissus’s phrases, by 
allowing his words and sounds to pass through her mouth, she would be 
able to draw him nearer to her, begin to identify with him, and ultimately 
respond to her beloved by appropriating his locutions for herself.”16  Echo 
eats well.  “When Echo appears to be merely miming Narcissus,” Pleshette 
understands her to be “in fact attempting the impossible—to appropriate the 
unappropriable, the foreign, the transcendent, the absolutely or wholly 
other.”17  Repeating Narcissus’s words, addressing his words back to him, 
“Echo not only speaks her own name but also declares her love.”18   
This love respects the other and makes possible the ethical relation.  
Pleshette observes that “it is Echo’s love that infuses and gives new life to 
the words of Narcissus.”19  In Echo’s “seemingly simple reply,” Pleshette 
hears an acknowledgement accepting “that the other has always come 
before me and that I am forever speaking the other’s language, borrowing it 
from him in order to speak to him.”20 
Echo’s words will have never been mere echoes.  And this is how I 
remember Pleshette’s teachings.  Her lectures were “close readings,” echoes, 
one might say, but not merely.  Pleshette made others’ words her own.  She 
conveyed something novel and inspiring through the considered, 
reassuring, and rhythmic quality of her speech.  She always told the story 
anew, and her presentation unfailingly came across with the force of a 
confidence at the same time subversive and respectful.   
Pleshette would always insist on rearranging the classroom in such a 
way that we could all face each other.  This involved everyone getting up 
and awkwardly working together to create a giant circle.  Once this task was 
accomplished, we would gather around, much like a family meal, and take 
in Pleshette’s words.  Pleshette knew how to eat well, and she knew what it 
meant to share it.  The furniture in Clement 213, that dreadful, asbestos-
plagued, wasp-inhabited, cave-like room, remains in Pleshette’s round-table 
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arrangement.  Her echoes resound there and elsewhere, continuing to 
nourish us and reminding us to nourish others.   
Le reste de Pleshette DeArmitt: what remains of her? what has she left 
over?  There is the photo in circulation, memorializing her piercing gaze and 
wry smile.  There is the work she and Kas were writing—on le reste, no less.  
And there is her commitment to what is left over, what remains outside of a 
philosophical system, what gets sacrificed for the formation of any subject, 
what resists incorporation: the indigestible, le vomit.  There is the rest of 
Pleshette DeArmitt, whose exemplary alterity I will never fully ingest, 
though the im-possibility of mourning her sustains me.  Through the loving 
declaration of her words, I will continue to ruminate on her image, to eat 
well, as she taught me to do, and to share this food only she could have 
given us to think. 
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